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JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY?  THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
SENTENCING AND CONFISCATION 
ORDERS UNDER THE PROCEEDS OF 
CRIME ACT 1991 
Louise Moreland* 
The Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 was enacted in response to concern about increasing serious and 
organised crime.  The Act aims to reduce such crime by providing an additional deterrent to traditional 
punishments by confiscating the profits of and property used to commit serious offences.  This article 
considers the relationship between confiscation under the Act and sentencing.  It is argued that the 
courts' approach to the application of the Act has not always been consistent, and that it is essential that 
the courts take forfeiture of property used to commit offences into account when sentencing in order to 
avoid potentially oppressive and arbitrary results. 
Beg that thou may’st have leave to hang thyself: 
And yet, thy wealth being forfeit to the state, 
Thou has not left the value of a cord.1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Since the enactment of the Proceeds of Crime Act in 1991, some $11.6 million worth of cash 
and property has been confiscated under its provisions.2  As provided for in the Act, this 
  
*  This paper was submitted in fulfilment of the LLB (Hons) requirements at Victoria University in 1999. 
1  William Shakespeare The Merchant of Venice Act IV, Scene 1 quoted in Auckland District Law Society 
Public Issues Committee Automatic Forfeiture on Conviction in New Zealand Statutes (Auckland District 
Law Society, Auckland, 1985). 
498 (2000) 31 VUWLR 
amount reflects the confiscation of the proceeds of serious offending and the property used to 
commit serious offences.  Overwhelmingly, the cash and property confiscated relates to drug 
dealing and fraud offences. 
The potential impact of the Act on offenders, their families and third parties is severe.  This, 
it seems, is the intention of the legislation as "traditional methods of punishment are not 
enough" to deter serious criminals.3  The legislation therefore seeks to undermine the economic 
base of organised crime by confiscating its profits and instruments. 
The Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 (PCA) is not unique in providing for this type of 
confiscation.  Several other Acts in New Zealand and overseas also provide for confiscation of 
the proceeds of or property used to commit offences.4   
An important question which arises under the PCA and other confiscation legislation is 
what should be the relationship between confiscation orders and sentencing. The preferred 
approach to this depends largely on whether confiscation orders are considered to be punitive.  
This article will consider the policy of confiscation orders under the PCA and will focus on 
how the relationship between sentencing and confiscation under that Act should be defined. 
Part II of this article outlines the key statutory provisions of the PCA, and Part III describes 
the background behind the enactment of the PCA.  Part IV then looks at the courts' application 
of the PCA.  The approach of the Australian and English courts to comparable legislation is 
also considered.  
Part V contrasts the approach of the courts to the PCA with their approach to confiscation 
provisions under other New Zealand statutes.  Finally, Part VI considers the approach the 
courts should adopt to the PCA.  It will be shown that, in particular, the courts' approach to 
forfeiture of property used to commit offences under the PCA has the potential to result in 
injustice in the treatment of offenders.  This article will conclude that an approach more 
                                                                                                                                                                        
2  Nick Smith "Filling Government coffers from a pot of gold" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New 
Zealand, 17 June 1999, A2. 
3  (4 September 1990) 510 NZPD 4303. 
4  These include the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; the Fisheries Act 1983; the Fisheries Act 1996; the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985; the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth, Aus) on which the New Zealand PCA 
was modelled; the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (UK); the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK) as amended by 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 (UK); the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (UK); and the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973 (UK). 
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consistent with the application of other confiscation legislation is required; one which 
acknowledges the punitive impact of such forfeiture, and takes this into account when 
determining the overall sentence. 
II PROVISIONS OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 1991 
The PCA provides for two types of confiscation order: a forfeiture order and a pecuniary 
penalty order.  The provisions of the Act apply only when a person has been convicted on 
indictment of an offence which is punishable by more than five years' imprisonment.5  In such 
a case, the Solicitor-General may apply to the court for a forfeiture order or a pecuniary penalty 
order (or both).6   
A Forfeiture Orders 
Under section 15(1) of the PCA the court has a discretionary power to order forfeiture of 
property which it is satisfied is tainted in respect of the offence.7  "Tainted property" includes 
both the proceeds of the offence and property that was used to commit the offence.8  
Section 15(2) sets out a number of factors which the court may consider when deciding 
whether to order forfeiture.  These include: the use that is ordinarily made of the property; any 
undue hardship which may be caused by the order; the nature and extent of the offender's and 
any other person's interest in the property; and any other matter relating to the nature and 
circumstances of the offence or offender. 
Forfeiture orders are made against the tainted property itself, and are not restricted to 
property in which the offender has an interest.  Therefore, orders may be made in respect of 
property in which a third party holds part of or the entire interest.  Some of this potential 
hardship to third parties may be reduced because the court can consider the extent of a third 
party's interest in the property when deciding whether to order forfeiture.9  In addition, a third 
  
5  That is, a "serious offence", s2(1) of PCA.  Under ss3 and 4 of the PCA, a person is considered to have 
been "convicted" if they plead or were found guilty of an offence, were found guilty of an offence and 
were discharged without conviction, or if they absconded in relation to the offence. 
6  Section 8 of the PCA.  The application must be made within the period of six months after conviction. 
7  The standard of proof to which the court must be satisfied in relation to any matter under the Act is on 
the balance of probabilities; s85 of the PCA. 
8  Section 2(1) of the PCA. 
9  Section 15(2)(c) of the PCA. 
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party who claims an interest in the property can apply for relief before or after the court makes 
a forfeiture order.10    
B Pecuniary Penalty Orders 
If the proceeds of an offence cannot be traced to specific cash or property which would 
otherwise be the subject of a forfeiture order, the court may make a pecuniary penalty order to 
recover the value of the benefits derived from the offence.  The term "benefits" is not defined in 
the Act beyond providing that the benefits may be acquired directly or indirectly.11  However, 
sections 27 and 28 provide guidance for the court when assessing the value of the benefits 
derived.   
Under those sections, the court may have regard to the value of any money, property or 
benefit coming into the possession of the offender by reason of the commission of the 
offence.12  The court may also consider the value of the offender's property before and after the 
commission of the offence (or offences).  Any increase in value may be treated as the value of 
the benefits, unless the offender proves that the acquisition of the excess was unrelated to the 
commission of the offence.13 
When valuing the benefits, the court is not entitled to consider any "expenses or outgoings" 
in connection with the commission of the offence.14  Once the benefits have been assessed, the  
 
  
10  Sections 17 and 18 of the PCA.  A legal or equitable interest is not required; "a right, power, or 
privilege in connection with the property" is sufficient to be eligible for relief; s2(1) of the PCA. If 
satisfied that the interest claimed by the third party is valid, the court is required to provide relief 
against forfeiture.  However, the court is not required to grant relief if the applicant was "involved in 
the commission of the offence in respect of which forfeiture [is sought]", or if the applicant did not 
acquire their interest in the property in good faith; s18(2) of the PCA. 
11  Section 2(3) of the PCA. 
12  Sections 27(2)(a) and (b) of the PCA. 
13  Sections 28(1), (2) and (3) of the PCA. Special provisions apply to valuing the benefits derived from 
drug-dealing offences. Under s2(1) of the PCA, "drug-dealing offence" is defined as any offence against 
s6 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 in relation to a Class A, B or C controlled drug where the quantity 
is greater than the quantity specified in s6(6) of that Act.  Unless the offender proves otherwise, the 
court must presume that all the property of the offender at the time the application for the pecuniary 
penalty order is made, and all the property acquired by the offender since the offence, came into the 
offender's possession by reason of the commission of the offence; s28(4) of the PCA. 
14  Section 27(3) of the PCA. 
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court may make a pecuniary penalty order for an amount not greater than that value.15  
C Relationship of Confiscation Provisions with Sentencing  
The PCA does not stipulate the relationship between confiscation orders and sentencing.  
However, the Act does provide that if an offender has not been sentenced when an application 
for a confiscation order is made, the court may defer sentencing until the application has been 
considered.16 
In addition, if sentencing has taken place before the confiscation order application is 
determined, any sanction imposed "in the nature of a pecuniary penalty or forfeiture of 
property" may be taken into account when considering the application.17  However, the statute 
is silent as to whether other sanctions are to be taken into account. 
III BACKGROUND TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE PCA 
The enactment of the PCA can be seen as part of an international trend to provide for the 
confiscation of the profits and instruments of serious crime.  Recent decades have witnessed 
international concern about the escalation of organised crime and the significant power and 
profits commanded by those involved.18  Large profits are generally the motivation for such 
offences, and it was believed that traditional penalties, including imprisonment and fines, were 
inadequate and ineffective deterrents.  In addition, growing awareness of the international 
nature of organised crime resulted in calls for the provision of mutual, cross-jurisdictional 
assistance in tracing and seizing the proceeds of crime. 
Thus, at a United Nations Conference in 1987, the international community resolved that 
new, stronger measures were necessary to deter organised crime.19  The United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988, which 
  
15  Section 25(1)(b) of the PCA.  The court has discretion to reduce the pecuniary penalty amount once the 
benefits have been assessed.  The court must reduce the amount by the value of any property forfeited 
as proceeds of the offence, or any pecuniary penalty already imposed; ss25(2)(a),(b) and (c) and 
s14(1)(b) of the PCA. 
16  Section 14(2) of the PCA. 
17  Section 14(1)(b) of the PCA. 
18  See John Thornton "Confiscating Criminal Assets" in Brent Fisse, David Fraser and Graeme Coss (eds) 
The Money Trail (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1992) 13 ["Confiscating Criminal Assets"]. 
19  "Confiscating Criminal Assets" above n 18, 14. 
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resulted from this conference, requires signatories to enact domestic confiscation legislation 
and to provide for international mutual assistance in recovering the proceeds of crime.20  
While some countries already had such legislation in place, others, including New Zealand, 
have since passed legislation to fulfil these obligations.21 
The New Zealand PCA was modelled on the Australian Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (PCA 
(Cth)),22 and the policy behind the two Acts seems to be very similar. The aim of this 
confiscation legislation is to:23 
strike at the heart of major organised crime by depriving persons involved of the profit and 
instruments of their crimes.  By doing so it will suppress criminal activity by attacking the primary 
motive – proft – and prevent the re-investment of that profit in further criminal activity. 
This highlights that the legislation aims to provide a deterrent to serious crime beyond that 
afforded by the traditional sentences of imprisonment and fines.  This derives from the belief 
that "the huge profits [derived from drug offences]…are so high that even very long prison 
sentences are not sufficient to deter people from getting involved".24  
In addition, the legislation is designed to prevent future criminal activity by removing the 
means of offending, such as profit for re-investment and property used to commit offences,25 
so that offenders are rendered incapable of future offending. 
  
20  M Dyhrberg and Chris Morris The Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 
1995) 2. 
21  David Fraser "Lawyers, Guns and Money" in Brent Fisse, David Fraser and Graeme Coss (eds) The 
Money Trail (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1992) 49 ["Lawyers, Guns and Money"].  The legislation 
New Zealand passed to fulfil these obligations was the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 and the Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992. 
22  (26 November 1991) 521 NZPD 5589. 
23  PCA(Cth) House of Representatives Debates (1987) vol 154, 2314 in John Thornton "The Objectives and 
Expectations of Confiscation and Forfeiture Legislation in Australia – an Overview" (1994) 1 Canberra 
Law Review 43 ["Confiscation and Forfeiture Legislation in Australia"].  In the New Zealand 
Parliamentary debates a similar view was expressed: "[t]he purpose of this Bill is to attack serious 
crime at its heart by confiscating the profits and preventing their re-investment in further criminal 
activity." (26 November 1991) 521 NZPD 5585. 
24  (26 November 1991) 521 NZPD 5589. 
25  (26 November 1991) 521 NZPD 5585. 
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The legislation also serves an important public policy purpose; an objective of the 
legislation is to dispel the notion "that after a possibly short period of incarceration a person 
will be free to enjoy the proceeds of his or her criminal activity".26 
Thus, consistent with the international community's concern regarding organised and 
serious crime, the PCA and the PCA (Cth) were enacted with the goals of deterrence, 
incapacitation, and enhancing public confidence in the criminal justice system.27 
IV  IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT 1991 BY THE COURTS 
A The Court's Approach in R v Brough 
An early and classic statement by the Court of Appeal regarding the policy of  confiscation 
orders is found in R v Brough.28  Brough involved an appeal against a pecuniary penalty order.  
The appellant had been convicted of a number of drug, dishonesty and firearms offences 
relating to a large scale cannabis operation conducted on his farm.29  The appellant was 
sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and fined $5,000.  In addition, he was ordered to 
forfeit $17,129.20 in cash, which was found at his property during a police search, and to pay a 
pecuniary penalty of $84,789.58.30   
The Court considered the nature of confiscation orders under the Act and clearly found that 
orders directed at either the proceeds of offending or the property used to commit offences are 
not imposed for the reason of punishment:31 
The policy of the Act…is twofold.  First, a person who has engaged in criminal activity should be 
required to disgorge…his or her ill-gotten gains.  Requiring these to be paid cannot in any way be 
regarded as a penalty.  Rather, it is simply a recognition that the law should not permit a person to 
retain the profits of criminal activity.  Secondly, it empowers the Court to forfeit property used to 
  
26  Director of Public Prosecutions Civil Remedies Report 1985-1987 in "Confiscation and Forfeiture 
Legislation in Australia" above n 23, 45; see also (4 September 1990) 510 NZPD 4303. 
27  "Confiscation and Forfeiture Legislation in Australia" above n 23. 
28  R v Brough (1994) 12 CRNZ 634 (CA). 
29  R v Brough above n 28, 636-637. 
30  R v Brough above n 28, 635.  The cash found at his property was evidently the proceeds of the offences.  
The Crown also initially sought forfeiture of the appellant's farm and two motorcycles which were 
used to commit the offences, but these applications were not pursued; R v Brough above n 28, 637. 
31  R v Brough above n 28, 639. 
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facilitate the commission of the offences.  That too is not for reasons of penalty or punishment, but 
rather in recognition of the principle that persons who use property to commit crimes should be 
liable to have that property forfeited. 
Consistent with its view that confiscation is not punitive, the Court in Brough stated that, as 
a general rule, confiscation orders should not be taken into consideration when the court is 
imposing the sentence for the offence.32 
However, in two situations, the Court did provide that confiscation orders may be relevant 
to assessing sentence.  The first is where confiscation orders, particularly relating to the 
forfeiture of property used to commit an offence, have a "disproportionate or exceptional effect 
on the offender".33  The second is where forfeiture of property used to commit an offence has 
such a severe deterrent effect that it "lessen[s] the need for the deterrent element in the 
sentence".34   
The Court was aware that both these exceptions relate to the forfeiture of property used to 
commit an offence, and noted that confiscation of the proceeds of an offence would be unlikely 
to have any relevance to sentencing. The Court justified this because confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime is designed to deprive the offender of his or her "ill-gotten gains".35  This 
philosophy seems analogous to the civil law concept of unjust enrichment.36 This principle 
provides that if someone has been enriched at someone else's expense, and it would be unjust 
to allow that person to retain the benefit, he or she must be deprived of that benefit.37   
  
32 R v Brough above n 28, 640. 
33 R v Brough above n 28, 640. 
34 R v Brough  above n 28, 640. 
35 R v Brough above n 28, 640. 
36  Arie Freiberg and Richard Fox "Forfeiture, Confiscation and Sentencing" in Brent Fisse, David Fraser 
and Graeme Coss (eds) The Money Trail (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1992) 106, 136 ["Forfeiture, 
Confiscation and Sentencing"]; M Hinton "Are drug trafficking confiscation orders punitive?" (1992) 
136 Solicitors Journal 1264 ["Are drug trafficking confiscation orders punitive?"]. 
37  JF Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen MD Todd The Law of Contract in New Zealand (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1997) 22. 
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While deprivation of unjust enrichment may incidentally serve a deterrent purpose, it is 
clearly not imposed as a punishment for the offence.38  It merely removes a gain or benefit to 
which the offender was never legally entitled so that it does not put the offender in a worse 
position than before the offence was committed. Therefore, it is not considered appropriate to 
make any allowance for this type of confiscation in the sentence imposed.39 
Clearly, however, forfeiture of property used to commit offences cannot be conceptualised 
as the deprivation of unjust enrichment, as property forfeited may have been acquired by 
lawful means.40  Further, this type of forfeiture does not merely restore the status quo as it 
puts the offender in a worse position than before the offence was committed, often by 
depriving him or her of substantial assets such as homes, farms, or vehicles.  It is therefore 
difficult, if not impossible, to regard such forfeiture as non-punitive.  This may explain why the 
Court in Brough was prepared to contemplate situations where forfeiture should be relevant to 
sentencing.  It is in relation to this type of forfeiture that the courts in subsequent cases have 
had particular difficulty defining its nature and relationship with sentencing. 
B The Courts' Approach to Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime 
Several later cases regarding confiscation of the proceeds of crime have adopted the 
position in Brough that such confiscation is not punitive,41 and have affirmed that no account 
of this should be taken in sentencing.42 
The approach of the courts in these cases mirrors the position of United Kingdom 
confiscation legislation which expressly stipulates that confiscation orders are not part of the 
  
38  "Are drug trafficking confiscation orders punitive?" above n 36, 1264; David J Fried "Rationalising 
Criminal Forfeiture" (1988) 79 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 328, 358 ["Rationalising 
Criminal Forfeiture"]. 
39  "Rationalising Criminal Forfeiture" above n 38, 358. 
40  Brent Fisse "Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime: Funny Money, Serious Legislation" (1989) 13 Crim LJ 
368, 369 ["Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime"]; "Confiscation and Forfeiture Legislation in Australia" 
above n 23, 50. 
41  See R v Andrian (1996) 13 CRNZ 449 (CA) and Solicitor-General v Carter (28 July 1998) unreported, High 
Court Hamilton Registry, M219/97.  See also R v McCormick (23 November 1994) unreported, Court of 
Appeal, CA180/94, 7, where the Court of Appeal held that the assessment of a pecuniary penalty 
order (or forfeiture order) cannot include "an additional element by way of punishment or penalty." 
42  R v Riki (26 August 1996) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA482/95. 
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sentence, 43 and that any confiscation order must be left out of account when determining the 
proper sentence for the offence. 44  
However, this approach is contrary to that taken by the Australian courts. Several 
commonwealth and state cases have held that confiscation of both the proceeds of and 
property used to commit offences is imposed for the reasons of "deterrence and punishment".45  
Further, the Australian courts have held that confiscation of the proceeds of crime may be 
relevant to the sentence imposed.46  In R v McDermott the Federal Court of Australia stated 
that:47 
if a confiscation order is made, that is a factor which is capable of affecting the proper sentence to 
be handed down in the same way as orders for compensation, restitution, forfeiture and the like. 
In that case, a pecuniary penalty order for a "substantial amount" was held to justify a 
reduction in the sentence.48 
However subsequent cases have noted that "the extent to which a pecuniary penalty order 
should affect a sentence will depend on the circumstances."49  In particular, if the order is 
unlikely to impact on the offender's assets, it may have little effect on the sentence.50 
Although the approach to confiscation of the proceeds of crime articulated in Brough has 
been the dominant one, there has been one situation in which the courts have indicated that 
  
43  Section 2(4) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (UK); s71(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK) as 
amended by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 (UK). 
44  Section 2(5)(c) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 (UK); s72(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (UK) as 
amended by the Proceeds of Crime Act 1995 (UK). 
45  R v Allen (1989) 41 A Crim R 51, 56 (Ct of Criminal Appeal of Vic); R v Rintel (1990) 3 WAR 527, 531 (SC 
of Western Australia).  This view has also been taken by the Australian courts to confiscation 
provisions under other Acts.  See for example Fang Chinn Fa v Puffett (1978) 22 ALR 149 (SC of 
Northern Territory) where forfeiture under fisheries legislation was clearly seen as punitive; R v Good 
(1986) 82 FLR 418 (SC of Tasmania) where forfeiture of a motor vehicle was seen as punitive. 
46  R v McDermott (1990) 49 A Crim R 105 (Federal Court of Australia); R v Allen above n 45, 57. 
47  R v McDermott above n 46, 116.  The Court was applying the view expressed in R v Allen above n 45, 
57. 
48  R v McDermott above n 46, 116. 
49  R v Tapper (1992) 64 A Crim R 281, 287 (Federal Court of Australia). 
50  R v Tapper above n 49, 287. 
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they might be prepared to adopt a position similar to that of the Australian courts.  This is 
when the profit made by an offender from a drug transaction has been reduced because he or 
she has had to pay a supplier for the drugs.  When addressing this situation in R v Pedersen,51 
the Court's interpretation of "benefits" for the purposes of determining the amount of a 
pecuniary penalty order suggests that it does see these orders as punitive.  In Pedersen the 
respondent received a total of $8,800 from an undercover police officer purchasing cannabis.  
The actual gain made by the respondent from the transactions was accepted to be only $240.52  
It was therefore necessary for the Court to decide which figure represented the value of the 
benefits derived by the respondent from the offences.53 
In the High Court, it was found that, in ordinary usage, "benefits" mean the profits 
derived.54  The Court stated that as "the aim of the legislation…is not to impose…an additional 
penalty…",55 the pecuniary penalty order should be made for the value of the net profits. 
This decision was overruled in the Court of Appeal where it was held that the benefit 
derived was the price paid to the respondent, or the gross profits.56  While the result may be 
severe, the Court found that this "gives the maximum effect to the clear policy of the Act"57 
and that this is a "penal statute, with drastic consequences".58  This suggests that  the Court 
  
51  R v Pedersen  (1995) 13 CRNZ 34 (CA). 
52  Solicitor-General v Pedersen (1994) 12 CRNZ 224, 225 (HC) [S-G v Pedersen]. 
53  Section 25 of the PCA. 
54  S-G v Pedersen above n 52, 225. 
55  S-G v Pedersen above n 52, 226. 
56  R v Pedersen above n 51, 39 per Cooke P (McKay J dissenting). The approach in Pedersen was followed 
by the High Court in Solicitor-General v O'Donnell (3 March 1997) unreported, High Court, Auckland 
Registry, M681/95.  In that case, the benefits derived by an offender were found to be a shipment of 
9,000 LSD tabs, even though a share of those was owned by a co-offender.  However, unlike the Court 
of Appeal in Pedersen, the Court exercised its discretion to reduce the penalty amount to reflect the fact 
that some of the benefit was not actually received by the respondent. 
57  R v Pedersen above n 51, 41 per Cooke P. 
58  R v Pedersen above n 51, 42 per Hardie-Boys J. 
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does see confiscation of the gross proceeds of an offence as imposing a form of punishment on 
the offender.59  
The Court in Pedersen was not required to consider the relevance of confiscation to the 
sentence imposed.  However, as discussed below, it is suggested that had it been required to 
do so, the sentence imposed should have taken the punitive effect of the confiscation into 
account. 
C The Courts' Approach to Forfeiture of Property Used to Commit Offences 
The statement in Brough that forfeiture of property used to commit offences is not generally 
to be regarded as punitive has caused some difficulty in subsequent cases.  Several cases have, 
in fact, departed from the view expressed in Brough and have held that this type of forfeiture 
does constitute punishment. 
For example, in R v Dunsmuir60 the Court of Appeal agreed that forfeiture of the proceeds 
of an offence could not be punitive.61  However, the Court seemed to depart from the 
approach in Brough by holding that forfeiture of the property used to commit an offence "goes 
further" and "is an additional penalty provided by Parliament as a deterrent…".62 A stronger 
departure from the policy of the Act as articulated in Brough can be found in Black v R,63 where 
the Court of Appeal noted that "the purpose[s] of the provisions relating to a forfeiture are 
necessarily deterrence and punishment".64   
A further case to find that forfeiture orders relating to property used to commit an offence 
are punitive is Solicitor-General v Wong65.  In Wong, the High Court had to decide whether to 
  
59  It may be that the legislation intended there to be an element of punishment in the confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime, as s27(3) directs the court to disregard any expenses or outgoings in relation to the 
offence.  However, in Pedersen the Court held that the cost of the drugs is not an expense or outgoing 
for the purposes of that section; R v Pedersen above n 51, 39 per Cooke P. The Court could therefore 
have avoided the punitive impact of confiscation of gross profits. 
60  R v Dunsmuir [1996] 2 NZLR 1 (CA). 
61  R v Dunsmuir above n 60, 6. 
62  R v Dunsmuir above n 60, 6 [emphasis added]. The approach in Dunsmuir was adopted by the High 
Court in Solicitor-General v McCurdy (4 May 1998) unreported, High Court Auckland Registry, M1/98. 
63  Black v R (1997) 15 CRNZ 278 (CA). 
64  Black v R above n 63, 281. 
65  Solicitor-General v Wong (1997) 14 CRNZ 624 (HC) [S-G v Wong]. 
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order forfeiture of the respondent's home, which had been used in connection with cannabis 
offences.  The serious offences in respect of which the property was tainted had been 
committed by the respondent's partner, but with the respondent's knowledge and 
acquiescence.66 
In deciding whether to order forfeiture, the Court found that it "must look at the degree to 
which the forfeiture, which is a punishment, equates with the wrongdoing of the respondent".67  
The Court held that the degree of the respondent's involvement in the offence was relevant "in 
determining whether forfeiture, being an ultimate deterrent penalty to her,…should occur",68 
as the punishment must "fit the crime".69  
This view of forfeiture of property used to commit offences as punitive seems to be 
reflected in the case of R v Merwood.70  Merwood concerned forfeiture of property used to grow 
cannabis. Merwood appealed against the sentence imposed, arguing that two years' 
imprisonment combined with the forfeiture of her home, was excessive.71  When sentencing 
Merwood, the trial judge said:72 
where a Forfeiture Order is made, and particularly in a case where it is a principal asset such as a 
home,…the Court ought to give some allowance for that on the starting point [for the sentence] that 
would otherwise apply… 
  
66  S-G v Wong above n 65, 627.  Wong plead guilty to the charge of knowingly permitting premises to be 
used for an offence against the MDA.  She was discharged without conviction.  This offence, however, 
is not a serious offence for the purposes of the PCA because its maximum penalty is three years' 
imprisonment (s12(2)(c) of the MDA).  However, the PCA does not preclude forfeiture of property 
used in offences which the owner did not commit; S-G v Wong above n 65, 628. 
67  S-G v Wong above n 65, 630 [emphasis added]. 
68  S-G v Wong above n 65, 631. 
69  S-G v Wong above n 65, 634.  The Court held that this inquiry was relevant under s15(2)(d) of the PCA 
which provides that the court may consider the nature and circumstances of the offence when deciding 
whether to order forfeiture. 
70  R v Merwood (23 May 1995) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 27/94. 
71  R v Merwood above n 70, 6-7. 
72  R v Merwood above n 70, 7. 
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In stating this, the trial judge purported to apply Brough.73  This may suggest that he 
considered forfeiture of a substantial asset, such as a home, as routinely falling within the 
exceptional circumstances in Brough.  The Court of Appeal did not depart from this decision, 
perhaps indicating that the exceptions in Brough have wider applicability than appeared from 
the original decision. 
Thus, perhaps as a result of the difficulty in conceptualising this type of forfeiture as non-
punitive, the courts seem to have been more willing to take forfeiture of property used to 
commit offences into account when sentencing. 
The courts also seem to have taken a broader approach than implied in Brough in 
determining whether the sentence imposed is a relevant consideration when ordering 
forfeiture.  For example, Solicitor-General v Sanders74 involved an application to forfeit property 
used to commit cannabis offences.  The respondent had previously been sentenced to four and 
a half years' imprisonment in respect of the offences.  The Court found that a severe penalty 
may be relevant when deciding whether to make a forfeiture order.75   
The Court also considered the effect of section 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
which provides the right "not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading or 
disproportionately severe treatment or punishment".  The Court found that, as the PCA does 
not specifically require the court to consider any sentence imposed when ordering forfeiture, 
the total package of imprisonment and confiscation orders may be disproportionately harsh.76  
However, the Court found that sections 15(2)(b) and 15(2)(d) allow a global approach to 
forfeiture, and that a disproportionately severe package should therefore be avoided:77 
Consequently I believe that the overall sanction package should be considered having regard to the 
spirit of the right not to be subjected to disproportionately severe punishment and having regard to 
the strength of any deterrent element necessary… 
  
73  R v Merwood above n 70, 7. 
74  Solicitor-General v Sanders (1995) 2 HRNZ 24 (HC) [S-G v Sanders]. 
75  The Court found that a severe penalty could be a relevant consideration under s15(2)(b) of the PCA 
which provides that the court may consider any undue hardship which may be caused by a forfeiture 
order. 
76  S-G v Sanders above n 74, 31. 
77  S-G v Sanders above n 74, 32. 
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The Court in Sanders therefore suggests that sentencing and forfeiture will have some 
relevance to each other, as taken together they must not be unduly harsh.78 This is consistent 
with the approach of the courts in Western Australia to similar legislation.  For example, in R v 
Rintel79 it was held that it is relevant to consider the sentence imposed when deciding whether 
to order forfeiture because "there must…be some proportionality between the totality of the 
final outcome and the gravity of the offence."80   
The Sanders approach is also consistent with the United Kingdom legislation which 
provides that when considering whether to order forfeiture, the court must consider the value 
of the property, and the likely financial and other effects on the offender of forfeiture taken 
together with any other order that the court contemplates making.81  This suggests that 
forfeiture will be relevant to sentencing, and that forfeiture "should not be combined with 
other penalties if the overall effect becomes too severe in the circumstances of the case".82 
This approach has been confirmed in cases under the Act.  In R v Lister,83 the Court held 
that it was relevant to consider the fact that the appellant's machinery had been forfeited when 
deciding whether the sentence imposed was excessive.84  Further, in R v Buddo,85 the Court 
held that the sentence imposed is a relevant consideration when deciding whether to order 
  
78  The Court in Dunsmuir also found that in some cases sentence may be relevant to forfeiture as a 
circumstance of the offender under s 15(2)(d) of the PCA.  The Court said this may be relevant if, for 
example, the sentence was imposed in ignorance of the possibility of a forfeiture application; R v 
Dunsmuir above n 60, 7. 
79  R v Rintel above n 45. 
80  R v Rintel above n 45, 532.  This approach was affirmed in R v Baxter (1991) 6 WAR 103, 104 (SC of 
Western Australia). However, the Court held that it is not relevant to consider disparity in sentences 
between co-offenders when deciding whether to order forfeiture. 
81  Sections 43(1A)(a) and (b) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 (UK). 
82  Andrew R Mitchell, Susan M E Taylor and Kennedy V Talbot Mitchell, Taylor and Talbot on Confiscation 
and the Proceeds of Crime (2ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1997) 207. 
83  R v Lister (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 331. 
84  R v Lister above n 83, 333. 
85  R v Buddo (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 268. 
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forfeiture.86  In that case, because the sentence imposed was relatively severe, the Court 
quashed the order for forfeiture of the appellant's motor vehicle. 
V IMPLEMENTATION OF OTHER CONFISCATION LEGISLATION BY THE COURTS 
As noted above, the PCA is not the only Act which provides for the confiscation of the 
proceeds or instruments of crime.  A number of other statutes established forfeiture regimes 
well before the enactment of the PCA.  
As with the PCA, by confiscating the profits of illegal activity these Acts aim to provide an 
additional deterrent to offending.  Confiscation of the property used to commit offences under 
these Acts also aims to deter crime and to prevent the commission of future offences by 
removing the means of offending.  Thus, while the actual provisions of these Acts vary, 
consideration of the courts' approach to the relationship between confiscation and sentencing 
under these statutes is relevant to the PCA because these statutes provide for the same sort of 
confiscation and were enacted with similar aims to the PCA.  
A Interpretation and Application of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 
1 Confiscation provisions under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 
Like the PCA, both the proceeds of offending and the property used to commit offences 
may be forfeited under the provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 (MDA).  On conviction 
of any offence under the MDA, all articles in respect of which the offence was committed are 
automatically forfeited.87  If a person is convicted under section 6 of the Act, the courts have a 
discretionary power to order the forfeiture of any money found in his or her possession;88 in 
addition, the court must order the forfeiture of any vehicle or vessel owned by the offender 
and used in the commission of the offence unless it would be unjust to do so.89 
The proceeds of drug dealing may be recovered by way of a fine imposed under sections 38 
and 39 of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978 (MDAA).  If an offender is convicted of 
  
86  R v Buddo above n 85, 270. 
87  Section 32(1) of the MDA.  Only articles which are in the offender's possession are liable to this 
automatic forfeiture. 
88  Section 32(3) of the MDA.  Such money is forfeited to the Crown if the court is satisfied that it was 
received in the course of the offence, or was for the purpose of facilitating the offence. 
89  Section 32(4) of the MDA. 
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drug dealing, and the court is satisfied that the offender has acquired any money or assets from 
the offence, the court may impose a greater fine than it would otherwise have done to reflect 
this.90  Further, if the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender was involved 
in drug dealing other than that for which he or she has been convicted, the court may increase 
the fine imposed on the offender to recover money or assets acquired from that previous 
dealing.91   
The imposition of a fine reflecting the proceeds of drug dealing under section 38 seems 
equivalent to a pecuniary penalty order imposed under the PCA.  However, unlike section 39 
of the MDAA, the PCA does not empower the court to recover the proceeds of drug dealing for 
which the offender has not been convicted. 
Where a person has been sentenced to imprisonment for specified drug offences,92 section 
6(4A) of the MDA directs the court to consider whether it should also impose a fine.  The court 
already has discretion to impose a fine under section 26 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985.93  
Therefore, section 6(4A) may simply be a signpost to remind the court to consider imposing a 
fine under the authority of that section.  It is likely that section 6(4A) is also a direction to the 
court to consider imposing a fine to recover the proceeds of offending under section 38 or 39 of 
the MDAA. 
2 Application of the MDA 
The MDA states that forfeiture is "in addition to any other penalty imposed".94  This may 
simply highlight that forfeiture is an additional response available to the courts when 
sentencing offenders.  This suggests that forfeiture may be part of, and relevant to, the sentence 
imposed.95  Alternatively, the statement may mean that forfeiture is to be ordered "over and 
above" the ordinary penalty for the offence.  Some support for both interpretations is found in 
the cases under the Act.  However, the courts have been more inclined to consider forfeiture of 
  
90  Section 38 of the MDAA. 
91  Section 39 of the MDAA. 
92  These are offences relating to class A or B controlled drugs against ss6(1)(a), (b), (c) and (f) of the MDA. 
93  Section 26 provides that where a court has the power to sentence an offender to imprisonment, the 
court may sentence the offender to pay a fine in addition to, or instead of, imprisonment. 
94  Sections 32 (1),(3) and (4) of the MDA. 
95  This would be in much the same way as a court may order a sentence of imprisonment and a fine. 
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property used to commit offences relevant to determining the sentence for the offence than 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime. 
In R v Delellis,96 the Court of Appeal considered the effect of forfeiture orders on the 
sentence imposed.  The case involved an appeal against a sentence for several offences 
involving cocaine.  In total, Delellis was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, fined $19,300 
under section 38 of the MDAA, and an order was made for the forfeiture of his car under 
section 32(4) of the MDA.   
The Court stated that: 97 
 [u]nlike the forfeiture of for example a motor vehicle under s32(4), and a fine under s6(4A), which 
are to be seen as components of the proper sentence for the offence, the forfeiture of money under s32(3) 
and the additional fine provided for by s38 of the 1978 Amendment Act,…are sanctions to be applied 
in addition to the proper sentence. 
Forfeiture under section 32(3) and fines under section 38 are to be in addition to the 
sentence imposed because they aim to confiscate "drug money".98   Thus no allowance should 
be made in the sentence because the offender was deprived of his or her "ill-gotten gains".  This 
is consistent with the courts' approach to the PCA.99   
However, the Court in Delellis suggests that the sentence should take account of fines 
"under section 6(4A)" and forfeiture of vehicles used to commit an offence.  The Court's 
language in the paragraph cited is confusing because fines are not actually imposed under 
section 6(4A).  However, it seems that the Court is referring to fines imposed generally as part 
of the sentence,100 and not fines designed to recover the proceeds of offences under section 38.  
The suggestion that forfeiture of a vehicle used to commit the offence should constitute part 
of the sentence was affirmed in R v Wong.101  In that case, the offender's vehicle was forfeited 
  
96  R v Delellis [1990] 2 NZLR 147 (CA). 
97  R v Delellis above n 96, 152 [emphasis added]. 
98  R v Delellis above n 96, 152. 
99  See for example R v Brough above n 28; R v Riki above n 42. 
100 Either under the section against which the offender has been convicted or under s26 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985. 
101 R v Wong (14 September 1994) unreported, High Court Palmerston North Registry, T28/94. 
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under section 32(4) of the MDA.  The Court also imposed a nine month suspended sentence 
and periodic detention, but did not impose any fine because it considered forfeiture to be "a 
sufficient additional penalty".102  This suggests that the Court did not consider forfeiture of the 
vehicle to be "over and above" the appropriate penalty but rather to be relevant to determining 
the appropriate sentence. 
Unless such forfeiture falls into one of the exceptional situations provided in Brough, the 
Court's decision in Brough seems inconsistent with taking this type of forfeiture into account 
when sentencing.  Therefore, the courts seem more willing to consider forfeiture of property 
used to commit offences as relevant to the sentence imposed when applying the MDA.  
Further evidence of the courts' reluctance to disregard forfeiture when sentencing under the 
MDA may be found in Commissioner of Police v Jones.103  In that case, the Court stated that 
forfeiture of money found in the offender's possession may be relevant to the imposition of a 
fine.104  The Court did not specify to which type of fine forfeiture may be relevant.  Clearly, 
forfeiture of money found in the offender's possession should be relevant to a fine imposed to 
recover the proceeds of an offence under section 38 to avoid double recovery.   
However, the Court may be indicating that forfeiture of money found in the offender's 
possession is relevant to any fine imposed as part of the sentence.  This would suggest that the 
Court sees such forfeiture as part of, rather than separate from, the sentence imposed.  This 
approach would, of course, be inconsistent with the Court of Appeal's decision in Delellis. 
B Interpretation and Application of the Fisheries Act 1983 and 1996 
1 Confiscation provisions under the Fisheries Acts 1983 and 1996 
The Fisheries Acts of 1983 and 1996 make provision for forfeiture of both the proceeds of 
and property used to commit offences.  On conviction, a person may be liable to forfeit the fish 
and proceeds of sale of fish in respect of which the offence was committed, the property 
(including vessels and equipment) used in the commission of the offence, and any quota 
  
102 R v Wong above n 101, 6.  The Court stated that a fine would have been imposed if forfeiture had not 
been ordered. 
103 Commissioner of Police v Jones (1990) 6 CRNZ 608 (HC) [Jones]. 
104 Jones above n 103, 611. 
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held.105  Like the PCA, forfeiture of property used in the commission of the offence is not 
limited to property in which the offender has an interest. 
The court's discretion is more limited under the Fisheries Acts than under the PCA.  Under 
the Fisheries Acts, the court is required to order forfeiture of the relevant property unless 
special reasons exist to order otherwise.106  Further, unlike the PCA, the Fisheries Acts 
specifically provide that any forfeiture is "in addition to, and not in substitution for, any other 
penalty".107 
2  Application of the Fisheries Acts 1983 and 1996 
The Fisheries Acts provide that forfeiture is not to be in substitution for any other penalty 
imposed. This has generally been interpreted by the courts as meaning that forfeiture is not 
part of the sentence and that no allowance for forfeiture should be made in sentencing.108  
However, several cases have held that the effects of forfeiture may be relevant to the imposition 
of a fine.  The first case to adopt this approach was MacDuff v Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries.109   In that case, the appellant had been convicted of taking undersized rock lobster 
tails, and was fined $2,500.  His vessel and equipment were forfeited under section 107B of the 
Fisheries Act 1983.   
To determine whether the fine was manifestly excessive the Court held that it was 
necessary to consider the means of the appellant, and that in doing so it could not ignore the 
fact that the appellant's vessel and equipment had been forfeited.110  This appears to be a 
reference to section 27 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, which provides that when imposing 
any fine, the court shall have regard to the offender's means and responsibilities. The appellant 
had limited financial resources and significant debts and responsibilities, and forfeiture of his 
  
105 Section 107B of the Fisheries Act 1983, s255 of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
106 See s107B(4) of the Fisheries Act 1983 and s255(2) of the Fisheries Act 1996 for examples. 
107 Section 107C of the Fisheries Act 1983 and s256(14) of the Fisheries Act 1996. 
108 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries v Sutherland (2 August 1988) unreported, High Court Invercargill 
Registry, AP 35/88, 6; Aston v Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (1994) 11 CRNZ 478 (HC), 481 [Aston 
v MAF]. 
109 MacDuff v Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (30 November 1990) unreported, High Court Invercargill 
Registry, AP 52/90 [MacDuff v MAF]. 
110 MacDuff v MAF above n 109, 5. 
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vessel prevented him from carrying on his business.  Considered in this light, the Court 
decided that the fine was manifestly excessive.111 
The approach in MacDuff has been applied in a number of subsequent cases.  Thus 
forfeiture may be relevant to the imposition of a fine to the extent that it impacts on the ability 
of the offender to pay any fine.112  As a corollary of this, the fact that an offender's property 
has not been forfeited may be a relevant consideration when imposing a fine under the 
Fisheries Act.  This approach was adopted in Blair v Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries113 and 
Gibbs, because if the offender's property has not been forfeited, his or her ability to pay any fine 
is not affected.114  
When applying the PCA, the courts have not relied on section 27 to consider the impact of 
forfeiture on the means of an offender to pay a fine.  However, the approach of the courts 
under the Fisheries Acts illustrates that they are generally reluctant to disregard the harsh 
effects of forfeiture of property used to commit offences when sentencing. 
C Interpretation and Application of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 
1 Confiscation provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 1985 
Under section 84 of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), the court may confiscate any motor 
vehicle which was used to commit or facilitate the commission of an offence.115  Similar to 
  
111 MacDuff v MAF above n 109, 6-7. 
112 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries v Montgomery [1993] DCR 872, 887; Aston v MAF above n 108, 482; 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries v Equal Enterprises Limited [1994] 2 NZLR 473, 479 (HC); and Siu v 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (26 April 1998) unreported, High Court Wellington Registry, AP 
131/98, 3. 
113 Blair v Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (12 July 1991) unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, 
AP 94/91. 
114 Section 27 was not referred to in Blair, and so it is unclear if the Court viewed the relevance of non-
forfeiture as limited to this factor.  If Blair is read as giving non-forfeiture relevance to the imposition of 
fines beyond its relevance to s 27, it would seem to be inconsistent with the legislation.  This is because 
the statute provides that forfeiture is not in substitution for any other penalty, suggesting that if 
forfeiture is not ordered, the other penalties should not be increased to compensate. 
115 Section 84 of the CJA. 
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section 25(2) of the PCA, the CJA provides considerations which the court may take into 
account when exercising its discretion to order confiscation.116   
Unlike the PCA, under the CJA only a vehicle in which the offender has an interest may be 
confiscated.117  Further, the CJA provides that confiscation may be "in addition to or instead of 
passing any other sentence".118  It is also important to note that confiscation under the CJA is 
not tantamount to forfeiture.  Under section 87 of the Act, confiscated vehicles are to be sold 
and the equity in the vehicle is paid to the offender once costs and any fines owing by the 
offender have been paid. 
2 Application of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 
The confiscation provisions under the CJA have not often been invoked in the courts since 
their enactment in 1976.119   Contrary to Brough's application of the PCA, in cases where 
confiscation has been considered under the CJA, it has been seen as appropriate to take 
confiscation into account when sentencing.  For example, in Vitolio v Police120 the trial judge 
had taken the confiscation of the appellant's vehicle into account when fixing the term of 
periodic detention.121  This approach was approved by the High Court. 
A similar approach was adopted in Wrathall v Police122 where the Court found that the 
effect of a confiscation order combined with a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment was 
manifestly excessive.  The Court took the view that "when considering confiscation [the Court] 
must have regard to the other consequences which have been imposed or which will take effect 
as the result of the Court's actions".123  These cases clearly seem to be more willing to take 
forfeiture into account when sentencing than the cases under the PCA. 
  
116 Section 84(4) of the CJA. These include: any undue hardship which may be caused to the offender in 
relation to his or her employment or trade; any undue hardship which may be caused to any other 
person; and the nature and extent of the offender's interest in the vehicle. 
117 Section 84(2) of the CJA. 
118 Section 84(2) of the CJA. 
119 MacFarlane v Police (23 July 1986) unreported, High Court Wellington Registry, M221/86, 3-4. 
120 Vitolio v Police [1994] 3 NZLR 210, 213 (HC). 
121 Vitolio v Police above n 120, 215. 
122 Wrathall v Police (30 April 1996) unreported, High Court New Plymouth Registry, AP 11/96. 
123 Wrathall v Police above n 122, 4. 
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D Conclusion 
From the above consideration of the courts' approach to confiscation legislation, it emerges 
that generally the courts do not consider the forfeiture of the profits of crime to be punitive.  
Thus, such forfeiture has been held to be separate from and additional to the sentence imposed 
for the offence.124  Apart from cases which are concerned with the gross proceeds of offences, 
this approach is consistent with the courts' application of the PCA. 
It is evident from cases under the MDA and CJA that the courts are more likely to consider 
forfeiture of property used to commit an offence as relevant to sentencing.  The Fisheries Acts 
have been interpreted as precluding the courts from taking forfeiture into account when 
sentencing.  However, the courts have not disregarded the effects of forfeiture under those 
Acts when imposing fines by applying section 27 of the CJA. 
It seems that the courts do not take such a generous approach when applying the PCA. 
However, it is argued that the courts' approach to other confiscation legislation should inform 
their approach to the PCA, because the statutes were enacted with similar purposes and 
provide for similar types of confiscation.  Further, while some of the statutory provisions vary, 
there is nothing in the PCA to preclude the adoption of a similar approach.  In fact, as will be 
explained below, there are a number of reasons why the general approach of the courts to 
other confiscation legislation should be applied to the PCA. 
VI HOW SHOULD THE COURTS APPROACH CONFISCATION UNDER THE 
PROCEEDS OF CRIME ACT? 
A Approach to Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime 
Under the PCA, to the extent that confiscation of the proceeds of crime reflects the actual 
profits of the offending, there can be no issue with the courts' approach of considering such 
confiscation as non-punitive and disregarding it when sentencing.  However, a problem arises 
in some situations because the courts have interpreted "benefits" to mean the gross profits or 
receipts of the offender.125 For example, this becomes an issue in cases where the offender does 
not cultivate or produce drugs, but must pay a supplier for them. 
  
124 R v Delellis above n 96, 152. 
125 R v Pedersen above n 51. 
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In this case, the offender has in fact only been enriched to the extent of the net profits.  
Therefore, confiscation of the gross profits goes further than restoring the status quo, as it puts 
the offender in a worse position than before the offence.126 Thus it can be argued that 
confiscation of anything more than the net profits amounts to punishment of the offender and 
should be taken into account when sentencing.  As will be discussed below, the courts' failure 
to adopt this approach has the potential to create injustice. 
B Approach to Confiscation of Property Used to Commit the Offence 
The courts' approach to the confiscation of property used to commit offences has not been 
consistent under the PCA.  This article contends that such forfeiture must be viewed as 
punitive, and that the courts should adopt the approach that such forfeiture is relevant to 
sentencing.  
One argument which may support the view that forfeiture of property used to commit an 
offence is not punitive, is that forfeiture under the PCA may be ordered regardless of who 
owns the property.  Forfeiture of property used to commit offences may be seen as "in rem" 
proceedings, where the focus is on the "guilty chattel" rather than punishment of the 
offender.127  Therefore, it may be argued that cases under the MDA and CJA, which do suggest 
that such forfeiture is punitive, should be distinguished because those Acts only confiscate 
property belonging to the offender. 
However, it has been argued that the concept of the "guilty chattel" is fictional because "[a]ll 
proceedings…are really against persons", not objects.128  It is submitted that conceptualising 
proceedings as "in rem" is simply a way of obscuring their punitive effect on offenders and 
third parties.129   
Further, the PCA itself indicates that the culpability or level of involvement of the owner is 
relevant to the question of forfeiture of his or her property.  This supports the view that 
  
126 "Confiscation and Forfeiture Legislation in Australia" above n 23, 50; M Weinberg "The Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1987 – New Despotism or Measured Response?" (1989) 15 Monash University Law Review 
201, 204; "Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime" above n 40, 377. 
127 "Confiscation and Forfeiture Legislation in Australia" above n 23, 49. 
128 "Fofeiture, Confiscation and Sentencing" above n 36, 142. 
129 "Forfeiture, Confiscation and Sentencing" above n 36, 143. 
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confiscation is a form of punishment of the owner because it will only be imposed if it is 
deserved.130 
Therefore, if forfeiture of property used to commit an offence is seen as punitive, it is just 
and logical that such forfeiture should be taken into account in sentencing.  While the Court in 
Brough held that this should only occur in exceptional cases,131 this article contends that justice 
cannot be achieved unless it is taken into account as a matter of course. 
C Avoiding Disproportionate Punishment 
As has been shown above, there are strong arguments suggesting that confiscation of the 
gross proceeds and property used to commit an offence is punitive.  When the courts adopt the 
view that such confiscation is not punitive and disregard confiscation when sentencing, a 
significant risk of injustice is created because the total sentence may be disproportionate to the 
offence.132  This is because a sentence which, on its own, may be appropriate for the gravity of 
the offence, may become excessive when combined with confiscation. 
That the punishment imposed must be proportionate to the offence is a fundamental 
requirement of retributive sentencing principles.133  Even when the objectives of deterrence 
and incapacitation are sought, which do not require proportionate sentences to achieve their 
ends, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has stated that: 134 
a reasonable relationship to the penalty justified by the gravity of the offence must be maintained.  
The desirability of prevention [of future offences] must be balanced against that gravity. 
  
130 See s15(2)(d), 17 and 18 of the PCA. 
131 M Dyhrberg and Chris Morris The Proceeds of Crime Act 1991 (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 
1995) 34. 
132 "Confiscation and Forfeiture Legislation in Australia" above n 23, 50. 
133 Andrew Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (2ed, Butterworths, London, 1995) 70. For evidence 
of this approach in New Zealand see R v Puru [1984] 1 NZLR 248; R v B [1984] 1 NZLR 261; R v Hiha 
[1987] 2 NZLR 119. 
134 R v Ward [1976] 1 NZLR 588, 591 (CA). 
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This approach, which emphasises the importance of ensuring that the sentence imposed 
bears some relationship to the gravity of the offence, has been affirmed in several later cases.135 
This is supported by section 9 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) which 
guarantees the right not to be subjected to "disproportionately severe treatment or 
punishment".  Thus if the courts fail to consider confiscation and the sentence together, the 
combined package may not only be unjust, but may also be contrary to the NZBORA.136  This 
is a strong argument supporting the view that the courts should take confiscation into account 
when sentencing. 
D A Change in Approach 
The above discussion indicates that a consistent and transparent approach to the PCA is 
needed, and that the courts should approach the PCA in the same way as they have 
approached other confiscation legislation.  Thus the courts should recognise as punitive both 
the confiscation of property used to commit offences, and confiscation of the gross profits of 
offences.  Once this is accepted, justice requires the courts to take this confiscation into account 
when imposing the sentence for the offence. 
The PCA already allows sentencing to be deferred until any confiscation application has 
been determined.137 Therefore, the use of this power to ensure that consideration of 
confiscation and sentencing occurs together seems critical to ensure that appropriate sentences 
are imposed. 
However, if a sentence is imposed before the confiscation application is decided, the courts 
can still consider the combined impact of confiscation and sentence when exercising their 
discretion to order confiscation.  If the application relates to property used to commit an 
offence, sections 15(2)(a) and (d) can be interpreted to allow the courts to have some regard to 
the sentence already imposed when deciding whether to order forfeiture.138  If the application 
  
135 See for example R v Agent (17 December 1980) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA 15/80; R v Pattison (2 
August 1988) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA93/88; R v O'Brien (17 May 1994) unreported, Court of 
Appeal, CA 514/93; R v Carter (30 July 1996) unreported, Court of Appeal, CA160/96. 
136 See S-G v Sanders above n 74, 31-32. 
137 Section 14(2) of the PCA. 
138 S-G v Sanders above n 74, 32; Auckland District Law Society Public Issues Committee Confiscation of the 
Proceeds of Crime (Auckland District Law Society, Auckland, 1993) 6. 
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relates to the proceeds of the offence, the courts could use their discretion to reduce the penalty 
amount to ensure that the total punishment is not disproportionate to the offence.139 
It could be argued that this approach will create significant controversy and attract 
criticism that the aims of the legislation will be defeated.  However, if the aim of the legislation 
is to deter serious crime by providing harsher penalties, this is not necessarily compromised by 
allowing confiscation to impact on sentencing.  Heavier penalties, including forfeiture, may be 
deemed desirable for such offending.  However, this should be brought about openly and as 
part of the sentencing process to ensure that fundamental principles of justice are not 
compromised.140 
VII CONCLUSION 
The PCA was enacted in response to concern about increasing serious and organised crime.  
The Act aims to reduce such crime by providing an additional deterrent to traditional 
punishments by confiscating the profits and means of offending. 
It has been shown that the courts' application of the PCA has not always been consistent.  
In particular, the question of whether confiscation orders are punitive has not been 
conclusively determined.  Further, the circumstances in which the courts will allow forfeiture 
to impact on the sentence imposed are not clearly defined. 
Several other statutes also provide for confiscation of the proceeds and instruments of 
crime, and were enacted with similar aims to the PCA.  From the cases decided under these 
statutes, it appears that the courts do consider that forfeiture of property used to commit 
offences should be taken into account when determining the sentence to be imposed. 
This article has argued that this approach should also be adopted under the PCA.  While it 
has been shown that confiscation of an offender's "ill-gotten gains" does not constitute 
punishment, it is submitted that confiscation of the gross profits of offences and property used 
to commit offences is punitive.  Therefore, it is essential that this type of forfeiture is 
considered when sentencing to avoid disproportionate punishment being imposed.  It is 
submitted that only by adopting this approach can the potentially arbitrary and oppressive 
operation of the PCA be avoided. 
  
139 Section 25(1)(b) of the PCA. 
140 "Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime" above n 40, 378. 
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